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It is the policy of courts generally to protect the free transfer of negotiable
paper. It is submitted, however, that the loser of the stolen bonds deserves some
consideration. If the disposition in a particular case depends upon the finding
with respect to the state of mind at the time of the purchase the judgment of
the fact finder is virtually unrestricted. In an equity case, and the instant case
was an equity case, the record will have to contain a finding with respect to the
purchaser's memory and recollections or the memory of the purchaser's
clerks at the -time of the purchase before a conclusion with respect to
good or bad faith can be supported. It is submitted that an additional objective standard the fact finders might be required to consider is whether the purchaser, for example a bond house or a bank, has devised some scheme consistent with business convenience to check stolen bond notices and to protect
themselves against making purchases of such bonds. See (1935) 45 YALE L. 3.

539. In such a case, too, the real determination would be with the fact finder,
but to consider what amounts to reasonable business practice would be an inquiry
in some degree less subjective than to inquire as to whether the officers of the
purchasing company have forgotten the notice of theft at the time of the purchase. A bond house or a bank might well be held to abide by a higher standard
of conduct with respect to "checking notices" than an "unprofessional" purchaser w6uld be required to follow.

CORPORATIONs-BY-LAws-RIGHT OF FIDUCIARY OFFICERS TO COMPENSATION.-

The defendant, a director, served also in the capacity of president and treasurer
of the corporation. Over a period of years, he appropriated to himself a considerable amount of money as salaries and commissions. This action is by
minority stockholders for the appointment of a receiver and for judgment against
the defendant for the amount of corporate funds alleged to have been improperly paid to him for his services. The contention is based on a by-law which
forbade any compensation for services of any nature to be allowed to any officer
or director of the corporation unless consent to the same had first been given
by the owners of three-fourths of the trust certificates. The defense was that the
by-law was void since it violated Section 180.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1933)
which provides that: "the stock, property, affairs, and business of every such
stock corporation, shall be under the care of and be managed by a board of
directors." The trial court found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, judgment as
to this defendant reversed and the cause remanded. Security Savings and Trust
Co. v. Coos Bay Lumber and Coal Co. (Wis. 1935) 263 N.W. 187.
The by-laws of a corporation which are contrary to or inconsistent with a
governing statute, are void, even though they may have been unanimously
assented to by the stockholders. They must be consistent both with the terms
and with the spirit and intent of the governing statute. 14 C. J. 362. In the case
of State ex rel. Badger Telephone Co. v. Rosenow, 174 Wis. 9, 182 N.W. 324
(1921) the by-laws provided that the corporation's secretary-treasurer was to be
elected by the stockholders. The court pointed out that such a by-law was
repugnant to a statute which provided that it is within the province of the
directors to elect that officer. See Wis. STAT. (1933) § 180.13. The same rule
applies to situations where the charter vests the management of the corporate
affairs in a board of directors and where later a by-law is enacted vesting the
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management of the corporation in an executive committee. Tempel v. Dodge,
89 Tex. 69, 32 S.W. 514 (1895).
However, in the instant case the court reasoned that it did not necessarily
follow from the fact that the by-law was void that the defendant was entitled
to retain such remuneration for his services. Courts in general hold that a
director or fiduciary official is presumed to serve without compensation. Only in
cases where there is a valid express agreement for the performance of the usual
and ordinary duties of his office is he entitled to compensation. Lowe v. Ring, 123
Wis. 370, 101 N.W. 698 (1904); Hinkley v. Sagemiller, 191 Wis. 512, 210 N.W.
839 (1927). The cases requiring an express contract for usual services, are confined to those where the officer is also a director or occupies a position of
"trust." Such a fiduciary officer may, however, recover on an implied contract for
services outside his ordinary functions, provided it is clear that it was understood
beforehand that such services were to be paid for. In a case where a bank
president had been appointed without any salary having been specified, the
Michigan court held that he could not recover on an implied contract for mere
rendition of services, even though they were outside those imposed upon him as
president. The absence of an implied agreement was clearly evident from the
lack of knowledge on the part of the directors, as a board or as individuals,
of the extraordinary services performed by the officer. Notley v. First State
Bank, 154 Mich. 676, 118 N.W. 486 (1908). The Iowa court decided that a vicepresident of a corporation who performed services for his company, which were
not incumbent on him by reason of his office, and which were not required by
his contract, but which were performed with the knowledge of the officers and
stockholders, was entitled to recover for the value of his services. Brown v.
Creston Ice Co., 113 Iowa 615, 85 N.W. 750 (1901). But see Edwards v. Fargo
& S. Ry. Co., 4 Dak. 549, 33 N.W. 100 (1887) where the court held that the
officer in suing for services need not distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary services when his duties were not. within the ordinary functions of his
particular office.
The court in the principal case reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and
sent the case back for a new trial to give the defendant an opportunity to show
whether any of his services might be classed as extraordinary, whether it might
be implied that there was any understanding that he was to get compensation
for these services, and what was the reasonable value thereof.
JOSEPH P. FLANNER.

CORPORATIONs-DIRECTORS-RELATION

TO

STOCKHOLDERS

INDIVIDUALLY.-The

defendant is a director, officer, and general manager of corporation A, a Wisconsin corporation, having a limited number of stockholders, and the stock of
which has never been listed on any exchange. The plaintiff's father was an officer
of the same corporation, and he owned a large block of stock therein. He died
and left substantial amounts of stock to both the plaintiff and her brother.
Neither the plaintiff nor her brother were ever actively interested in the corporate
affairs and after her father died, the plaintiff moved from the state. Corporation
A owned almost all of the stock of corporation B, and carried the same on its
books at par value; although corporation B had built up a large surplus, such
earnings were not shown on the books of corporation A. The defendant and codirectors received an offer from responsible business men who were willing to
buy four-fifteenths of corporation B for four million dollars. In order to effect
the deal, a plan of reorganization of corporation B was decided upon. Pursuant

